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PSYCHOLOGY and ART
by ANDRE STRAUSS
'But even Freud is not enough. In the hands ot 
Freud, psychoanalysis was a living organism in con­
stant evolution. Since Freud's death orthodox psy­
choanalysis has become a closed, almost scholastic 
system, itself no exception to the general cultural 
trend towards stereotypy and sterility. Rigorous 
probing^ reveals that the entire metapsychological 
foundations of psychology need reinterpretation. It 
is well known that orthodox psychoanalysis has been 
unable to make much out of Freud's later concept 
of the death instinct; even the earlier and sup­
posedly better established concepts of sexuality, 
repression, and sublimation need reformation.'
(Life A ga in st Death, The Psychoanalytical 
M eaning O f  History. Norman Brown. W e s­
leyan University Press. 1959.)
This essay does not purport to be academic. 
The author does not assume the right to evaluate 
any facet of experience from a hypothetical dis­
passionately critical position. While it is obvi­
ous that categorical statements will be made, they 
will be made in terms of himself as an organism, 
caught in space and time, and in the possession 
of a history, but essentially limited by these con­
ditions. The author does not presume to speak 
for questionable abstractions.
With the inception of psychoanalysis as a pos­
tulated vehicle for the interpretation of human 
behaviour and its elaboration into a system based 
on scientific observation and clinical procedure, 
its essentially metaphysical basis has gradually 
become displaced by the belief that its factual 
nature must constitue a truth. It has therefore 
become a mechanical science. In an age largely 
encamped in the service of Dialectical Material­
ism, where any equation has validity only in 
terms of its demonstration as a visual phenomen­
on, there has arisen simultaneously a depraved 
evaluation of the nature of the ‘fact’ . Only when 
this has been revaluated, only when the ‘fact’ 
constitutes an ‘interpretation’ of experience, can 
the fallacy disappear. Both Science and Religion 
are endangered by the vice of accepting unques­
tionable initial postulates. What is demanded is an 
examination of the essential nature of the vehicles
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by which they effect their formulation. Only 
when it is realised that articulacy has in its em­
ployment only a symbolism can these various 
systems be seen for what they are. To cope with 
this misintepretation there has arisen in the 
twentieth century the concept of the Semantic 
approach to the meaning of languages. This 
science has justly argued that the human organ­
ism tends to read into experience the structure of 
the language which he uses. It is not my concern 
here to demonstrate the applicability of various 
definitions employed by Semantics, but merely 
to demonstrate that in the face of Semantics, the 
language, in no matter what form it may appear, 
whether in the services of literature, mathematics, 
science, or logic, remains essentially a symbolism, 
and therefore merely a structure for the com­
munication of experience. In the light of this, 
the essentially hypothetical nature of psychologi­
cal postulates is retained, and it can be seen 
merely as a structure among structures for the 
evaluation of experience. For it will be noted 
that the language (again in the general sense) 
does not move toward experience, but parallel to 
it. It may be argued that certain terminologies 
are less capable of satisfying experience than 
others, and rightly so. But simultaneously it 
must be recognised that there exists no univer­
sally infallible symbolic structure. The mathe­
matical equation cannot and does not pretend to 
deal with the world of feeling. Caught in this 
fallacy the utility psychologist or psychiatrist 
often fails to appreciate the privacy of the sub­
jective world. It becomes impossible for him to 
conceive of the delusions of the paranoic as hav­
ing any reality whatsoever. In fact, the defini­
tions of psychology are often undermined by its 
own practioners who assume the possibility of a 
clinical approach and thereby grant themselves 
immunisation from the human condition as 
structured by their own science. This is the re­
sult of the fallacious interpretation of the con­
cept of the ‘norm’ as an absolute rather than as a 
concept introduced in order to regulate variables. 
In effect, the insistence by the individuals on the 
capacity for objective judgements, which can 
alternatively be phrased as the resistence of the 
individual to any acts of consciousness other than
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the cognitive, must surely constitute in terms of 
the Freudian equation merely a demonstration 
of the principle of repression.
From neurotic symptoms, dreams and errors 
to a general theory of human nature may seem 
like a long step. Granting that it is a long step, 
Freud could argue that he is entitled to explore 
the widest possible application of a hypothesis 
derived from a narrow field. He could take the 
offensive and claim that traditional theories of 
human nature must be regarded as unsatisfactory 
because they have nothing to say about these peri­
pheral phenomena. What theory of human race, 
except Freud’s, does have anything significant to 
say about dreams or insanity? And are dreams 
and insanity really negligible factors on the peri­
phery of human life.
But the truth of the matter is that Freud main­
tains that to go from neurotic symptoms, dreams 
and errors, to a new theory of human nature in­
volves no further step at all. For the evidence 
on which psychoanalysis erects the hpotliesis of 
the repressed unconscious entails the conclusion 
that it is a phenomenon present in all human be­
ings. The psychopathological phenomena of 
everyday life, although trivial from the practical 
point of view, are theoretically important because 
they show the intrusion of unconscious inten­
tions into our everyday and supposedly normal 
behaviour.
Even more theoretically important are dreams. 
For dreams, also ‘normal’ phenomena, exhibit in 
detail not only the existence of the unconscious 
hut also the dynamics of its repression —  the 
dream censorship. But since the same dyna­
mics of repression explained neurotic symptoms, 
and since the dreams of neurotics are the clue to 
the meaning of their symptoms and differ neither 
in structure nor in content from the dreams of 
normal people, the conclusion is that the dream 
is itself a neurotic symptom. We are all there­
fore neurotic. At least dreams show that the dif­
ference between neurosis and health prevails only 
by day; and since the psychopathology of every­
day life exhibits the same dynamics, even the 
waking life of the ‘healthy’ man is pervaded by 
innumerable symptom-formations. Between nor­
mality and abnormality, there is no qualitative, 
but only a quantitative difference, based largely 
on the practical question of whether our neurosis 
is serious enough to incapacitate us for work.’
(Ibid .)
On his seventy-fourth birthday, at a function 
given in his honour, Freud declared that his was 
not the discovery of the subconscious, but merely 
the creation of a means for its evaluation. Its 
discovery, he maintained, was due to the poets. 
In the light of this statement, it seems that a 
whole new interpretation can be thrown on the 
nature of the creative process. Through the cen­
turies attempts have been made to evaluate the 
nature of the arts without there ever having 
appeared a really adequate theory. For an ac­
tivity so essentially serious in nature, an activ­
ity possessing the capacity of so great an effec­
tive symbolic potency the tendency has been, by 
and large, to accept it with the confused venera­
tion which denotes a lack of enthusiasm as to 
discovering its actual nature and the pressures 
which produced it. No greater fallacy has ever 
been uttered than ‘Art for Art’s sake’, and on 
the syntactical level, no more meaningless a 
phraseology could be invented. Generally speak­
ing, the creative process has been accepted as 
arising out of the most brilliant minds of any 
period for the greater glory of the particular cul­
ture which produced that mind. The creative 
process has perpetually been confused with ‘taste’ 
( another concept which has never been adequate­
ly explained) and it is only in this century, as a 
result of the structure offered by psychoanalysis, 
that there has been any concern with the neces­
sity for redefining it.
It is the contention of the writer that the basic 
purpose or meaning, and hence the pressure 
which produces it, is therapeutic; that the crea­
tive process with its ramifications of an elabor­
ately formal symbolism corresponds almost di­
rectly in nature to the dream. However, inas­
much as the creative process does not find equal 
articulation, but is confined to a few members of 
the cultural group, it becomes obvious that an 
elaboration of the concept must be propounded 
before it can become acceptable. Obviously, the 
creative mind must be motivated by some neuro­
sis which is not mutually exclusive of all the 
members of a society, or conversely it must re­
ceive its propulsion from a condition which 
demands at least the creation of a highly com­
plex symbolic sequence in order to satisfy or 
resolve itself. Furthermore, the nature of the 
creative act is to develop a symbolic sequence, or 
rather a subjective equation for experience which 
nevertheless must satisy the disease of the parti­
cular mind. One answer as to why the symbolism
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should become so highly developed (what has, 
for instance, been described as the ‘ internal log­
ic’ of poetry, music, painting, the novel, etc.) is 
that it attempts characteristically to recreate ex­
perience into an equation which stimulates a 
genuine experience. In fact, it is perpetually at­
tempting to propagate subjective dimensions, or 
to create symbolic structures which the human 
organism could himself occupy. Without at­
tempting to provide the extensive definition of 
its processes, the symptom symbolism, or syn­
drome, is equivalent to that of the schizoid and 
schizophrenic. It may be of interest to record 
here that in a recent sample taken from the group 
of contemporary American composers, 58% de­
monstrated neural patterns clinically diagnosed as 
schizophrenia. The problems remains, however, 
as to how the creative mind, while apparently 
demonstrating the watertight evidence of an ad­
vanced neural aberration, nevertheless retains the 
capacity for a successful manipulation of the ego 
within the group.
In the field of literature, the group of writers 
selected for the purposes of this essay covers the 
period from roughly immediately before the ap­
pearance of the Freudian equation up till the pre­
sent day. Inasmuch as such a survey would, in 
order to adequately explicate its premises, need 
to be of book length. For the purposes of this 
essay, it is therefore only possible to provide a 
few suggestions and to severely limit itself in 
order to provide at least a clarity of intentions.
The work of Fyodor Dostoevsky has earned 
him a reputation of daemonic possession. The 
following extract is taken from a work which 
appeared in 1864 and described itself as ‘Notes 
From Underground’ the title being in itself sig­
nificant.
‘I want to tell you, gentlemen, whether you 
care to hear it or not, why I could never become 
an insect. I tell you solemnly, that I have many 
times tried to become an insect. But I was equal 
not even to that. I swear, gentlemen, that to be 
too serious is an illness —  a real thoroughgoing 
illness. For man’s everyday needs, it would have 
been quite enough to have had the ordinary hu­
man consciousness, that is, half or quarter the 
amount which falls to the lot of a cultivated man 
°f our unhappy nineteenth century, especially 
one who has the fatal ill-luck to inhabit Peters­
burg, the most theoretical and intentional town 
°n the whole terrestrial globe. (There are inten­
tional and unintentional towns). It would have 
been quite enough, for instance, to have the con­
sciousness by which so-called direct persons and 
men of action can live. I bet you think I am 
writing this from affectation, to be witty at the 
expense of men of action; and what is more, that 
from ill-bred affectation I am clanking my sword 
like an officer. But, gentlemen, whoever can 
pride himself on his diseases, and even swagger 
over them.
Though, after all, every one does do that; 
people do pride themselves on their diseases, and 
I do, may be, more than any one. We will not 
dispute it, my contention was absurd. But yet I 
am persuaded that a great deal of consciousness, 
in fact, is a disease. I stick to that. Let us 
leave that too, for a minute. Tell me this: why 
does it happen at the very, yes, at the very mo­
ments when I am most capable of feeling every 
refinment of all that is ‘good and beautiful’, as 
they used to say at one time, it would as though 
of design happen to me not only to feel but to 
do such ugly things, such that . . . Well, in 
short, actions, that all, perhaps commit; but 
which, as though purposely occurred to me at the 
very time when I was most conscious that they 
ought not to be committed. The more conscious 
I was of goodness and of all that was ‘good and 
beautiful’ , the more deeply I sank into my mire 
and the more ready to sink into it altogether. But 
the chief point was that all this was, as it were, 
not accidental in me, but as though it were bound 
to be so. It was as though it were my most nor­
mal condition, and not in the least disease or 
depravity, so that at last all desire in me to 
struggle against this depravity passed. It ended 
by my believing that this was perhaps my nor­
mal condition.’
Initially it is intriguing to discover at this 
date an equation of behaviour which involves the 
theory of a repressed unconscious as well as a 
possible vehicle for its cure. More significant 
for the purposes of this essay is the relationship 
which holds between the writer and the hero. Is 
it possible for the hero, a fragmented entity in 
himself, to be so clearly articulate, in effect so 
distanced from his condition. It may even be 
possible to ask the pecular question of whether 
a person whose universe was similarly structured 
could possess the additional motivation of desir­
ing to clinically describe it. In short, what is 
the purpose of ‘Notes From Underground’ ? To 
rephrase the question; of what significance
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would it be to the writer as he exists in the con­
text of his hero to adopt the further context of the 
dispassionate observer of that condition, i.e. as 
he exists as the actual writer? The fact that 
both Freud and a body of writers arrived more 
or less simultaneously at a new vehicle for the 
analysis of human behaviour can be prosaically 
ascribed to the fact that the Kantian (Cogito ergo 
sum:)  definition had exhausted itself. What is 
noteworthy, however, is the new role into which 
the creative mind is precipitated by the postulate 
of a subconscious. Initially he becomes the ob­
server of himself (the whole trend of Existen­
tialist thought has demonstrated, not a corpor­
ate body of thought and its elaboration, but a per­
sistent and relentless pursuit of the ‘self’ ) inas­
much as he now possesses the capacity for differ­
entiating various levels of existence within him­
self. He becomes his own mirror. It may of 
course be argued that this constitutes a new ten­
dency in say, literature, but upon closer exam­
ination will reveal that the whole process of crea­
tive thought has revolved around a similar pivot, 
btit has merely employed different conceptual 
structures for its analysis. We have in Dostoev­
sky the concept of consciousness as being ‘sick’ ; 
we have the therapy suggested as being tbe con­
scious acceptance of that sickness, and further­
more we have the implication that the process of 
acculturation must inevitably produce that sick­
ness. All three of these evaluations are later to be 
echoed by Freud. Nevertheless, if one is to pos­
tulate the premise of the creative act being in it­
self and by itself a therapeutic act created in 
terms of a schizoid or schizophrenic condition, 
then this definition must, in a sense, be capable 
of expansion into a wider field. Furthermore, 
it must be postulated that the individual must be 
capable of precipitating and withdrawing himself 
from that condition. In other words, the crea­
tive mind induces a schizoid or schizophrenic 
condition within himself (he creates a so-called 
‘alter ego’ ) in order to explore the symptoms and 
processes of his ‘own’ subconscious, and conse­
quently, by so doing, effects a therapy. This is 
of course, too glib. Freud himself, at the end 
of his life, maintained that the processes of psy­
choanalysis were ‘both intolerable and intermin­
able’ . The subconscious is not a shallow recess, 
nor are the profits of sublimation (in the Freu­
dian sense) in any way a cure-all. Before pro­
ceeding further, we should turn to various other 
writers.
The following two excerpts are from Rilke's 
The Notebooks Of Malte Laurids Brigge:
‘One comes along, one finds a life, ready-made, 
one only has to put it on. One wants to go or 
is forced to g o : well, no trouble at a ll: voila 
votre mort, monsieur. One dies at random; one 
dies whatever death happens to belong to the di­
sease one has : for since one knows all the di­
seases, one knows that the different lethal con­
clusions belong to the diseases and not to the hu­
man beings; and the sick person, as it were, 
doesn’t have anything to do.’
‘We discover that we do not know our role; 
we look for a mirror; we want to remove our 
make-up and take off what is false and be real. 
But somewhere a piece of the disguise that we 
forgot still sticks to us. A trace of exaggeration 
remains in our eyebrows; we do not notice that 
the corners of our mouths are bent. And so we 
walk around, a mockery and a mere half, nei­
ther having achieved being nor actors.’
The following excerpt is taken from an essay 
entitled Self-Deception by Sartre.
‘To escape from these difficulties people gladly 
have recourse to the unconscious. In the psycho­
analytical interpretation, for examplee they use 
the hypothesis of a censor, conceived as a line of 
demarcation with customs, passport division, cur­
rency control, etc. to re-establish the duality of 
the deceiver and the deceived. Here, instinct, or 
if you prefer, original drives and complexes of 
drives constituted by our individuality, or indivi­
dual history, make up reality. It is neither true 
nor false since it does not exist for itself. It sim­
ply is, exactly like this table, which is neither 
true nor false in itself, but simply real. As for 
the conscious symbols of the instinct, this inter­
pretation takes them not for appearances but for 
real psychic facts. Fear, forgetting, dreams, 
exist really by virtue of concrete facts of consci­
ousness, in the same way as the words and the 
attitudes of the liar are concrete, really existing 
patterns of behaviour. The subject has the same 
attitudes to these phenomena as the deceived to 
the behaviour of the deceiver. He establishes 
them in their reality and must interpret them. 
There is a truth in the activities of the deceiver; 
if the deceived could reattach them to the situa­
tion where the deceiver establishes himself and to 
his project of the lie, they would become integral 
parts of the truth, by virtue of the behaviour of 
lying. Similarly there is a truth in the symbolic
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acts; it is what the psychoanalyst discovers when 
he reattaches them to the historical situation of 
the patient, to the unconscious complexes which 
they express, to the blocking of the censor. Thus 
the subject deceives himself about the meaning of 
his conduct, he apprehends it in its concrete 
existence but not in its truth, for lack of being 
able to derive it from the original situation and 
from a psychic situation which remains alien to 
him.’
Now inasmuch as the human organism is cap­
able of employing a structure of duality in order 
to explain phenomena within himself, or rather 
to be in a position from which meaning can be 
attributed to those phenomena, the further ques­
tion arises as to whether the mode of any parti­
cular creative mind produces a further bifurca­
tion in the act of creation. It seems possible that 
this may be the case. If we accept the condition 
of creativity as being a process whereby an org­
anism attempts to establish a symbol structure 
by which his own symptoms may be made arti­
culate, then generally speaking he is attempting a 
duality by positing a patient-physician relation­
ship within himself. It should be remembered 
at this point that the continuum of time in the 
creative symbolism is an abrogation of that indi­
vidual’s actual history, that in the capacity of 
physician, the individual is not involved in the 
process of suffering experience but merely to 
evaluate a suffering which is construed as oc­
curring to the patient in the relationship. This 
condition is an induced condition, for the mo­
ment that the particular mind is once more pre­
cipitated into an objective, or factual historical 
context he once more becomes vulnerable to his 
actual history. Obviously the creative act, just 
as an act of articulacy, is a defence mechanism, 
but its peculiar nature is that of the schizoid and 
schizophrenic conditions.
To elaborate the concept, it may be added that 
the structure employed by the mind in this capa­
city is frequently capable of assuming a dominant 
role within the personality. Even as the fact 
merely constitutes the application of meaning to 
experience, so the employment of a structural 
context may become progressive until the organ­
ism is engulfed. This then must constitute a 
schizoid condition.
Observable in the creative mind is the condi­
tion of an anguish arising out of that condition, 
inasmuch as the organism tends to consider it­
self entombed or contained in a dimension which 
is separate from itself as an active entity in a 
public or objective dimension. The essential 
nature of the creative act is essentially a passiv­
ity, the organism exists merely as an onlooker, 
and because this passivity seems to offer the pos­
sibility of a lessened vulnerability to situations, 
the tendency is to adopt that structure as per­
manent. Although the so-called Existentialist 
thinkers have been branded as individuals, it is 
not in their capacity for action. Most notewor­
thy of these thinkers is their conception of their 
own isolation coupled with a withdrawal from 
the world of experience. There is the tendency 
to operate in a vacuum, a vacuum which becomes 
a tomb. Obvious too is their preconception with 
a world of petrified things. In another sense, 
Shakespeare, too, is frequently perturbed by a 
duality, which in his case is structured into the 
attribution of a condition of evanescence belong­
ing to the physical world. This is most markedly 
demonstrated, not only in Hamlet, but in Pros- 
pero as well, and appears as the hidden theme 
throughout the sonnets. John Donne was an­
other mind haunted by the same fear.
However, if the creative act is in fact a thera­
peutic act (employing the same devices active in 
the schizophrenias) then the problem occurs as 
to whether there is the possibility of an active 
therapy —  a problem which applies directly to 
the principles of psychoanalysis as well. At this 
point only timid statements can be proffered, for 
while the contemporary trend is toward a belief in 
the chemical roots and alleviation of the insani­
ties, psychoanalysis has by no means disproved 
itself. It may at this point be suggested that the 
actual physical act of creation is the pivot upon 
which the therapy hinges, for while the organism 
continues to act under the impulsion to externa­
lise his condition, any full-blown dementia-prae- 
cox condition can obviously not occur. It may 
be argued that some deeper agency of self preser­
vation is the motivating agency in this situation, 
or it might be that the secretion of poisons in 
the cerebral tissues is not sufficient to totally dis­
arrange the neural sequences, to the extent where 
they impede his capacity for work or superiority 
in certain relationships.
